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MARKET WITH ENDOGENOUS ORDER TYPES
Edouard Challey Edouard Chrétienz
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Abstract. We analyse the joint determination of price informativeness and the com-
position of the market by order type in a large asset market with dispersed information. The
market microstructure is one in which informed traders may place market orders or full demand
schedules and where market makers set the price. Market-order traders trade less aggressively
on their information and thus reduce the informativeness of the price; in a full market-order
market, price informativeness is bounded, whatever the quality of tradersinformation about
the assets dividend. When traders can choose their order type and demand schedules are (even
marginally) costlier than market orders, then market-order traders overwhelm the market when
the precision of private signals goes to innity. This is because demand schedules are substi-
tutes: at high levels of precision, a residual fraction of demand-schedule traders is su¢ cient to
take the trading price close to traderssignals, while the latter is itself well aligned with the
dividend. Hence, the gain from trading conditional on the price (as demand-schedule traders
do) in addition to ones own signal (as all informed traders do) vanishes.
1. Introduction
We analyse the joint determination of price informativeness and the composition of the market
by order type in a large, competitive asset market with dispersed information. The market mi-
crostructure we consider is one in which informed traders may place either full demand schedules
or more basic market orders, i.e., order to sell or buy a xed quantity of assets unconditional on
the execution price.1 There are also noisetraders who prevent the asset price from being fully
revealing whenever the precision of private signals is bounded, as in, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz
(1976, 1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) and others. After informed and noise traders have
placed their orders, the trading price is set by a competitive, utility-maximising market making
sector. We characterise the trading intensities associated with each order type, the ex ante utilities
that they generate for the concerned traders (hence their preference for a particular type of order),
and ultimately how the composition of the market interacts with the informativeness of the price.
We rst consider the case where exogenous measures of demand-schedule and market-order
traders coexist in the market. In a pure market-order market (as in, e.g., Vives, 1995), the
informativeness of the price is bounded above, however precise private information about the
dividend is. In contrast, whenever demand-schedule traders are in positive mass the informativeness
of the price is unbounded as the quality of private information goes to innity. The reason for this
di¤erence lies in the way private information is incorporated into the price in either case. Because
We are particularly grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments and to the editors for their guidance.
Edouard Challe acknowledges the support of chaire FDIR. All remaining errors are ours.
yCNRS (UMR 7176), Ecole Polytechnique, CREST and Banque de France; Email: edouard.challe@gmail.com.
zCREST; Email: edouard.chretien.2008@polytechnique.org.
1See Brown and Zhang (1997), Wald and Horrigan (2005) and Vives (2008) for further disscussion of the impor-
tance of market orders in actual asset markets.
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market-order traders face price risk since their orders are unconditional on the e¤ective trading
price, they trade less aggressively on their private information than demand-schedule traders,
which reduces the informativeness of the price. In contrast, demand-schedule traders are insulated
from price risk, so their trading intensity grows without bound as their private information becomes
innitely precise; in the limit, they perfectly align the trading price of the asset with the dividend
(formally, the trading price is at least as informative of the dividend as the signals received by
informed traders, and sometimes more).
Motivated by these observations, we examine informed traderschoices of order type and the
impact of these choices on the composition of the market and the informativeness of the price.
Since demand schedules are more complex than market orders (due to the full conditionality of
the amount of trade on the price), we assume that they are more costly, at least marginally. Our
main result is that, when the precision of private signals is large, then the equilibrium is necessarily
interior (i.e., market-order and demand-schedule traders are both in strictly positive measures),
but market-order traders overwhelm the market (i.e., their measure tends to one as precision goes
to innity). In other words, when the quality of information is high, the gain from conditioning
ones trades on the price (as demand-schedule traders do) in addition to conditioning on ones own
signal only (as market-order traders do) vanishes and thus falls short of the cost, however small,
for most traders.
There are two potential reasons for which this could be the case, and it is the purpose of the
information structure that we assume with potentially correlated noise in the signals received by
informed tradersto disentangle them. First, knowledge of the price could become less and less
valuable because ones own signal becomes more and more aligned with the information of others
as the quality of private information improves (since all signals then get closer to the true value
of the dividend). In other words, the advantage of acquiring information about the distribution of
the signals received by others through the price (as in, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976; Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1981) is reduced when this distribution tightens, and vanishes in the limit. The
other reason why knowing the price could become less valuable when private information become
very precise is related to the price impact of noise trading. Demand-schedule traders trade against
observed discrepancies between the trading price and their signals, and their trading intensity rises
with the precision of the signal. As this precision goes to innity, they trade so aggressively against
noise traders that they e¤ectively close the gap between the trading price and the dividend. By
eliminating noise trader risk, demand-schedule traders reduce the value of knowing the price in
addition to the signal itself. Considering the full spectrum of signal correlations allows us to identify
which of the two informational roles of the price drives our main result. We show that the use of
demand schedules vanishes at high levels of information precision even when signals are perfectly
correlated, i.e. when information about the dividend is public. In this situation the price no longer
plays any role as an aggregator of dispersed information. It follows that it is the reduction in the
impact of noise trading on the equilibrium price that explains why knowledge of the price loses
value as the information about the dividend becomes very accurate. Put di¤erently, our analysis
uncovers a form of substituability between demand schedules: when signals about the dividend
are accurate, a small fraction of demand-schedule traders is enough to keep the price close to the
signals they receive, which are themselves close to the true value of the dividend; hence, it is less
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useful to know the price in addition to ones own signal, so the incentive to purchase a demand-
schedule is reduced.2 In this sense, the pure demand schedule specication (the benchmark in the
literature on price informativeness) is not innocuous and may not be stable to plausible changes
in the microstructure of the market (here: the availability of a simpler, but cheaper, alternative
order type).
Our analysis relates to at least two strands of the literature: one that explores the properties
of asset prices under alternative order types and market microstructures, and one that studies the
joint determination of information acquisition and equilibrium prices. The focus on market orders
as opposed to limit orders, stop orders or full demand schedules in the market microstructure
literature can be traced back to Vives (1995), Medrano (1996) and Brown and Zhang (1997).3
Vives (1995) studies a pure market-order market while Vives (2008) considers a market with
exogenous sets of trader types. Medrano (1996) analyses the order choice of a single monopolistic
trader, in the tradition of the insider tradingliterature. In contrast, we consider the endogenous
determination of the sets of market-order versus demand-schedule traders in a large, competitive
asset market. Brown and Zhang (1997) study tradersorder choice in a large market, but in their
model those who do not place market orders are dealers who observe the order ow but are
uninformed about the asset dividend. The interest in the joint determination of equilibrium prices
and information acquisition started with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), followed by Verrecchia
(1982) and more recently Barlevy and Veronesi (2000), Peress (2010) and Vives (2013). While this
literature has traditionally focused on information acquisition about asset payo¤s, our focus is on
traderswillingness to purchase an information set that includes the trading price (as is the case
with a demand schedule) in addition to a free signal about the asset payo¤.
Many of our results follow from the fact that market-order traders trade less aggressively than
demand-schedule traders and thereby reduce price informativeness. Let us stress that this is by no
means the only reason why price informativeness may be impeded relative to the competitive, full
demand-schedule benchmark. First, there might be some unlearnable residual uncertainty about
the dividend, a possibility explored by Angeletos and Werning (2006, pp. 17345) in a somewhat
di¤erent context. They show that this causes the precision of the price signal to be bounded
above, whatever the precision of the private signals on the learnable part of the dividend. Market
frictions may also limit tradersreaction to their information and thus price informativeness. For
example, short-sale constraints limit tradersresponsiveness to bad news (Miller, 1977; Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1987; Bai et al. 2006). Similarly, under imperfect competition traders reduce their
trading intensity so as to avoid revealing their private information (Kyle, 1989). Our approach
is closer in spirit to the latter contribution in that limited trading aggressiveness follows from
the microstructure of the market, rather than outside restrictions about the learnability of the
information or the size of trades.
Section 2 presents the trading game. Section 3 analyses the case where order types are exoge-
2This relies on demand schedule traders not reaching measure zero, in which case the price would no longer be
well aligned with their signals. We show, however, that this cannot be the case under endogenous order types. The
reason is that in a full market-order market the aggressiveness of informed traders is bounded above, hence these
traders no longer eliminate noise trader risk when signals are very precise; this makes demand schedules valuable
again and ensures that demand-schedule traders have strictly positive measure.
3See Medrano (1996) and the references therein for a detailed disucssion of the early literature on market orders,
and Vives (2008) for the more recent papers.
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nous, and Section 4 that where they are endogenous. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model
We consider the following competitive model of asset trading. There are two assets: (i) a riskless
bond in perfectly elastic supply and paying out a constant interest rate; and (ii) a risky asset with
trading price p and terminal dividend , where  is drawn from the distribution N  ;  1 ,  > 0,
before any trading takes place. Traders know the distribution of  but not its realisation.
There is a continuum of informed traders i 2 I = [0; 1], each of whom gets a free private, noisy
signal about the dividend xi =  + 
 1=2
x i, with x > 0; i  N (0; 1) and cov (i; ) = 0. We
allow the noise in the private signals to be cross-correlated and parameterise this property by the
correlation coe¢ cient  2 [0; 1]. We adopt the convention that the average of i.i.d. random variables
with mean zero is zero and we let ~  R 10 idi  N (0; ) and i  i   ~  N (0; 1  ) denote,
respectively, the aggregate and idiosyncratic components of the noise in the private signals.4 As 
gets closer to one the information received by informed traders gets increasingly shared between
themselves; when  = 1 private signals are perfectly correlated and the private signal i is just
the public signal ~. In contrast, as  goes down then the noise components become increasingly
uncorrelated across traders, and we recover the usual specication with uncorrelated informational
noise with  = 0. We may rewrite the private signal xi as follows:
xi =  + 
 1=2
x
~ +  1=2x i; (1)
which implies that xi provides a noisy signal about +
 1=2
x
~ (with neither  nor ~ being individ-
ually observed).
Aside from informed traders, there are noise traders in the market, which place a net asset
demand for the risky asset "  N  0;  1" , with " > 0. Following Vives (1995, 2008), we consider
a competitive market microstructure wherein (a) all or some traders place market orders (rather
than full demand schedules), and (b) a (competitive, risk-neutral) market-making sector sets the
price p. In contrast to a demand schedule, a market order is conditional on the private signal xi
but not on the execution price p; once placed, it is executed irrevocably at whatever value of p is
set by market makers. The market-making sector observes the order book L () emanating from
informed and noise traders and sets the price p; competition among risk-neutral market makers
then causes them to undercut each other until p = E [jL ()]. Note that L () is itself a function
of p whenever a positive mass of informed traders places demand schedules.
We introduce a general correlation structure for the signals received by informed traders for
the following reason. In our model placing a full demand schedule (as opposed to a market order)
allows a trader to trade conditionally on the price, which is valuable for two very distinct reasons.
First, the price aggregates dispersed private information and thus provides additional information
about the fundamental relative to ones own signal. Second, it provides information about the
realised amount of noise trading; that is, it e¤ectively allows a trader to partly hedge noise trader
risk (to which a market-order trader is exposed). For  2 [0; 1), these two informational roles of
price are present, but when  = 1 only the second one is. Hence, considering the full correlation
4See Vives (2013) for a model with a similar form of cross-correlation between agent types (formulated in terms
of the marginal utility of a good, rather than a direct signal about an asset payo¤).
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spectrum [0; 1] will shed light on which role of the price really matters for our results.
Let M  I be the set of market-order traders and InM the complementary set of demand-
schedules traders, of measure   RInMdi 2 [0; 1]. We will consider both the case whereM and InM
are exogenous (Section 3) and that where they are endogenous (Section 4). All informed traders
have zero initial wealth (this is without loss of generality) and preferences V (wi; i) =  e iwi ,
where i > 0 and wi = (   p) ki are the risk aversion coe¢ cient and terminal wealth of trader i,
respectively. We denote by  1I 
R
I 
 1
i di the average risk tolerance of informed traders. We rank
informed traders in nondecreasing order of risk aversion and dene the nondecreasing function  :
[0; 1]! R+. Finally, we assume that (i) i is increasing and continuous in i and such that 0 > 0;
and (ii)  1i is independent of i   ~, i.e., 8J  I;
R
J 
 1
i (i   ~)di = 0 a.s.
Denition. A Bayesian equilibrium of the trading game is a pair of investment functions for
demand-schedule (kInM (xi; p; i)) and market-order (kM (xi; i)) traders as well as a price function
p(; ~; ") such that (i) kInM () and kM () maximise informed tradersexpected utility:
8i 2 InM; kInM (xi; p; i) 2 arg max
k2R
E[V ((   p)k; i)jxi; p]; (2)
8i 2M; kM (xi; i) 2 arg max
k2R
E[V ((   p)k; i)jxi]; (3)
and (ii) the market-making sector sets the price p = E[jL()], where
L (p) =
Z
InM
kInM (xi; p; i)di+
Z
M
kM (xi; i)di+ ": (4)
We then have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The trading game has a unique linear Bayesian equilibrium, which is characterised by:
 The investment functions
kInM (xi; p; i) =
 + xxi   (x + ) p
i (1 + (1  )B2"=x) and kM (xi; i) =
(xi   )
i
; (5)
with
 =
h 
 1x + 
 1

  
1 +B2 1x "
   B2"  1 +  1x +  1i 1 ; (6)
 The price function
p(; ~; ") = (1  B)  + B( +  1=2x ~ +B 1"); (7)
with
 = B"

B2" (1 + =x) + 
 1
: (8)
In those functions, B > 0 is the unique real solution to the cubic equation:
B =
x
 1
InM
1 + (1  )B2"=x +
(1  )  1M 
 1x +  1

(1 +B2"=x)  [B2" (1 + =x) + ] 1
; (9)
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where  1InM   1
R
InM 
 1
i di and 
 1
M  (1  ) 1
R
M 
 1
i di are the average risk tolerance coe¢ -
cients of demand-schedule and market-order traders, respectively.
Lemma 1 generalises the trading game in Vives (2008, Sec. 4.3) in two directions: i) heteroge-
nous risk aversion, and ii) correlated noise in the private signals. Heterogeneity in risk aversion is
the dimension along which informed traders sort themselves into demand-schedule versus market-
order traders in Section 4. The possibility that private informational noise be correlated will imply
that our results do not depend on whether the signal xi is private ( < 1) or public ( = 1).
Equation (7) implies that observing p is equivalent to observing  +  1=2x ~ + B 1". Hence p
provides a public signal that is jointly informative of , ~ and ". Note that the signal extraction
problem faced by demand-schedule traders is more involved when  2 (0; 1) than when  2 f0; 1g.
When  = 0 we have ~ = 0 a.s., hence p provides a signal about  with noise B 1". When  = 1,
the public signal + 1=2x ~ is observed (i.e., i = 0 8i) jointly with p, hence B 1" can be perfectly
inferred (see (7) again). In contrast, when  2 (0; 1) then ~ must be inferred together with  from
the observation of p. This joint signal extraction problem manifests itself by a greater residual
uncertainty about  (conditional on a given signal xi) when  2 (0; 1) than when  2 f0; 1g, which
lowers the responsiveness of the demand for assets by demand-schedule traders to their signal.5
3. Exogenous trader types
We rst analyse price informativeness at high signal precision when the distribution of informed
traders across types is exogenous. We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (a) In a pure market-order market ( = 0), the informativeness of the price signal
is bounded above; formally, p !
x!1
B20" < +1, where B0 > 0 uniquely solves MB0( 1   
 + "B
2
0
 1
) = 1. (b) Whenever there is a positive mass of demand-schedule traders ( > 0),
then the precision of the price signal is unbounded as x !1; more specically,
p 
x!+1
1>0 (x=) + 1=0(x=InM )2"
Proposition 1 shows that the speed of information aggregation as x ! +1 depends on both
the cross-correlation of informed traders signals and the share of market-order traders among
them. First, whenever  > 0, then information aggregation is less e¤ective when  > 0 than when
 = 0 (the informativeness of the price p grows at the rate of x in the former case but at the rate
of 2x in the latter). Second, information aggregation is less e¤ective when  = 0 than otherwise
(the informativeness of p is bounded above as x !1 in the former case, not in the latter).
The intuition for the second result follows from our assumed information structure and its
implications for the Bayesian updating problem of demand-schedule traders. As stressed above,
this problem is more involved when  > 0 than when  = 0: in the latter case the quality of the
price signal p is only blurred by the extent of noise trading ", while in the former it is also blurred
by the common informational noise component ~. As x increases and private signals become more
and more aligned with , the impact of " on p diminishes (since " is constant) but that of ~ does
5This e¤ect shows up in the fact that the multiplier x=

i
 
1 + (1  )B2"=x

in the investment function
of demand-schedule traders (see (5)) has the term  (1  ) in the denominator. This product is equal to zero for
 2 f0; 1g but is positive for  2 (0; 1) and is maximal at  = 1=2.
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not (since its precision 1=V( 1=2x ~) = x= increases at the rate of x). In the special case where
 = 0 the informativeness of p grows very rapidly (at the rate of 2x) because the common noise
component e¤ect is absent; whenever it is present, the quality of the price signal cannot grow at
a rate faster than x. This suggests that the usual specication where  = 0 is somewhat special
and that the conclusions drawn from it are not necessarily robust. Here it implies that as x grows
large then xi (whose precision grows at rate x) looses value relative to p (whose precision grows
at the rate of 2x); eventually, demand-schedule traders only base their Bayesian estimate of  on
p. In contrast, when  > 0 and the informativeness of p grows at the same rate as x, then xi and
p keep constant weights in the computation of the posterior mean of  as x ! +1.
The intuition for the rst result in the proposition (i.e., that price informativeness is bounded
when  = 0) is as follows. In a pure demand-schedule market ( = 1), informed traders can
condition their trades on p, so the only source of risk they face concerns the true value of .
As the precision of private signals increases, informed traders collectively trade more and more
aggressively against any discrepancy between p and . Formally, from (1) and Lemma 1 the total
asset demand by informed traders in a pure demand-schedule market can be written as:
Z
I
 
 + x( + 
 1=2
x
~ + 
 1=2
x i)  (x + ) p
i (1 + (1  )B2"=x)
!
di = B

   p+ 
x
 
   p+  1=2x ~ ;
where B uniquely solves BI
 
1 + (1  )B2"=x

= x (since InM = I and hence  = 1).
The latter expression implies that B ! +1 as x ! +1, and thus, by equations (7)(8), that
p !  as x ! +1 i.e., in the limit p becomes perfectly informative of . In contrast, in a
pure market-order market ( = 0) informed traders do not condition their trades on p and hence
face a residual payo¤ risk even as the xis get more and more informative of . This risk leads
market-order traders to trade relatively less aggressively on the basis of their private signal, which
limits the amount of information that is transmitted into the price. Formally, from Lemma 1 again
the total asset demand by informed traders in a pure market-order market is:
Z
I
 
( + 
 1=2
x
~ + 
 1=2
x i   )
i
!
di =
( + 
 1=2
x
~   )
M
;
where  is given by (6) B solves (since  = 0):
 
 1x + 
 1

  
1 +B2"=x
   B2" (1 + =x) +  1 = 1=(MB)
In this situation, as x ! +1 we have B ! B0 (> 0), where B0 is the unique solution to 
 1   1=
 
B2" + 

MB = 1. By implication, the trading intensity of market-order traders
is bounded above as x ! +1. From (7), as  = 0 and x ! +1 we have:
p! 
=" +B
2
0
 
 +B 10 "

B20 + ="
:
Thus, asymptotically observing the price is equivalent to observing  + B 10 ", i.e., p provides
a signal about  with precision B20" < +1. The intermediate case  2 (0; 1) retains the main
properties of the pure demand-schedule case, because any positive measure of demand-schedule
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traders is su¢ cient for their trading aggressiveness (which is unbounded as x ! +1) to eliminate
the impact of " on p. As we show next, this intermediate case is that which necessarily arises in
equilibrium when traders are free to choose their order type and the quality of information is high.
4. Endogenous trader types
We now analyse traderschoice of order type and determine the equilibrium setsM and InM . The
basic tradeo¤ is that a demand schedule isolates a trader from price risk, but requires the trader
to place a large (innite) number of limit orders to generate complete conditionality of trades on
the execution price. We capture this tradeo¤ by normalising the cost of a market order to zero
and setting that of a full demand schedule to c > 0. We know from the CARA-Normal model that
the value function associated with the information set Gi is:
W (Gi; i)  max
k
E[V (wi   c)jGi; i] =   exp

 E[   pjGi]
2
2V[   pjGi] + ci

;
where  = 1 if Gi = (xi; p) (i.e., the trader places a full demand schedule) or  = 0 if Gi = xi (i.e.,
the trader places a market order). LetWInM (xi; p; i) andWM (xi; i) denote the expected utilities
of a demand-schedule and a market order trader, respectively, with preferences i and conditional
on their full information set (i.e., xi or (xi; p)). There are two possible timing assumptions here,
depending on whether we allow informed traders to choose their order type after (timing 1) or
before (timing 2) observing xi. Under timing 1 traders compare expected utilities conditional
on xi (i.e., WM (xi; i) and E

WInM (xi; p; i)
xi), while under timing 2 they compare the same
expected utilities integrated over xi (i.e., E [WM (xi; i)] and E

WInM (xi; p; i)

).6 The following
Lemma shows that the expected utility ratios are the same under the two timing assumptions,
hence both lead to the same discrete choice of order type.
Lemma 2. The ratios of conditional and unconditional expected utilities are given by:
WM (xi; i)
E

WInM (xi; p; i)
xi| {z }
timing 1
=
E [WM (xi; i)]
E

WInM (xi; p; i)

| {z }
timing 2
= e ci
s
V[   pjxi]
V[   pjxi; p]| {z }
common value of the ratio
;
where V[   pjxi; p] and V[   pjxi] are given by equations (A2) and (A4) in Appendix A.
In other words, when we move from timing 1 to timing 2, both expected utilities change but
in the same proportion, leaving the basic tradeo¤ between order types unchanged. It follows that
under either timing informed trader i places a demand schedule if and only if the relevant ratio is
below or equal to one. Given the value of V[  pjxi]=V[  pjxi; p], computed from equations (A2)
6The equilibria that we focus on under timing 1 are linear Bayesian equilibria with linear price functionals. In
these equilibria informed traders choose their type on the basis of their risk aversion only (and not, say, on the level
of their signal). Consequently, (i) the distribution of signals remains independent of that of risk aversion within each
set M and InM , even though these are determined after the signals are observed; and hence (ii) the equilibrium
measure  is uninformative of the dividend. Note that even in this timing WInM (xi; p; i) is not known because it
is a function of p, a random variable at the time the order type is chosen. In contrast WM (xi; i) is known, since
it is not conditional on the yet unknown value of p (by the mere denition of a market order). This is why traders
must compute E

WInM (xi; p; i)
xi and compare it with WM (xi; i).
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and (A4) in the appendix, this is equivalent to:
i   = 1
2c
"
ln
 
1
x + 

+

x
+

B2"
2
+
(1  )
x
+
1
B2"
!
  ln
 
1

 
1 

1 +

x
+
(1  )
x + (1  )B2"
 1!
1 +

x
+

B2"
2!#
; (10)
where, from Lemma 1,
B =

x
(1 + (1  )B2"=x)
Z  1()
0
 1i di
+

1
x
+
1


1 +
B2"
x

  1
B2" (1 + =x) + 
 1 Z 1
 1()
 1i di: (11)
with  1 () = 0 if  <  (0) and  1 () = 1 if  >  (1). For (x; ; "; ) 2 R+3  [0; 1] given,
the properties of the  function imply that the solution (;B) to (10)(11), if it exists, can be of
three types: it is either such that  2 [ (0) ;  (1)], in which case the solution is interior (i.e.,M 6= ;
and InM 6= ;); or  <  (0), so that the solution is corner and all traders place market orders (i.e.,
(M; InM) = (I; ;)); or  >  (1) and all traders place demand schedules (i.e., (M; InM) = (;; I)).
The intuition for the sorting of traders along the degree of risk aversion is that greater risk aversion
lowers trading aggressiveness, hence the expected benet from expanding the information set from
xi to (xi; p). Proposition 2 states our main results under endogenous order types:7
Proposition 2. For any (; "; ) 2 R+2  [0; 1], and as x ! +1, (a) the solution (;B) to
(10)(11) is unique; (b) both M and InM have strictly positive measure (i.e., the equilibrium is
interior); (c)  ! 0 (i.e., market-order traders eventually overwhelm the market); (d) p goes
to innity as the same rate as x; formally, dening the bijection h : R+ ! (0; 1), h (x) =
+ (1 )1+(1 )x
  
+ x 1
 1 and h 1 its inverse, we have
p 
x!1
x
+

h 1 (e 20c)
 1 :
Our information structure gives us some intuition about why demand-schedule traders vanish
as x ! +1 (point (c)). In our analysis p plays two distinct informational roles: it provides
information about the distribution of signals received by the other informed traders, and about the
net asset demand of noise traders. In the special case where information about  is entirely public
(i.e.,  = 1), there is nothing to learn from the other informed traders by observing p. However,
trading conditional on p is still valuable because this provides insurance against noise trader riskto
which market-order traders are exposed. That the crowding out of demand-schedule traders by
market-order traders as x ! +1 also takes place when  = 1 suggests that when the quality of
information is high the primary value of a demand schedule relative to a market order comes from
its hedging role against noise trader risk, rather than its role at extracting dispersed information.
7Note from (10) that heterogeneity in c is formally equivalent to heterogeneity in . To encompass both cases,
rank traders in nondecreasing orders of g (i)  c (i)  (i), assume that g (i) is continuous, strictly increasing, that its
reciprocal is continuous, and that 0 < g (0) < g (1) < +1; then solve for the marginal trader exactly in the same
way as in the case where c is homogenous.
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It follows that for the share of demand-schedule traders to vanish when signals become increasingly
precise, it must be that the gain from hedging noise trader risk itself vanishes. But the reason for
this is immediate: as the precision of information increases, demand-schedule traders trade more
and more aggressively on their information. In so doing, they take p closer and closer to their own
signal xi, which is itself closer and closer to . Eventually, they completely eliminate noise trader
risk, and thereby the relative benet of a demand schedule.
This feature also explains why the equilibrium must necessarily be interior, i.e., why InM ,
whilst asymptotically vanishing, must always keep positive measure (point (b)). If it were not the
case, then the market would be a full market-order market similar to that examined in Section
3. In this situation, the trading intensity of informed traders would be bounded above, hence the
uncertainty about the dividend would be bounded below (see Proposition 1). But then noise trader
risk would no longer be eliminated even at high levels of precision of the signals, and thus knowing
the price (in addition to the signal about the dividend) to insure against noise trader risk would
become valuable again. Demand schedules thus display a form of substituability: when information
about  is precise, then a positive but small measure of demand-schedule traders deters all the
other traders from placing a demand schedule (however small c is).
Finally, the informativeness of p (point (d)) is closely related to the composition of the market
(point (c)). As discussed in Section 3, market-order traders tend to reduce information aggregation.
Consequently, the gradual crowding out of demand-schedule traders as x ! +1 tends to reduce
the pace of information aggregation, relative to the case with constant, exogenous shares of each
type. For example, in the case where  = 0 the precision of the price signal grows at the rate of
x, instead of 2x when the sets M and InM are exogenous.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed the joint determination of price informativeness and the composition of
the market in a large market with dispersed information. By allowing market-order and demand-
schedule traders to coexist, and by letting traders choose their preferred order type, the microstruc-
ture considered here is richer and more realistic than the pure demand schedule/Walrasian auction-
eer specication. Our main result that the set of demand-schedule traders vanishes when signals
become highly informative follows logically from the structure of the trading game, so we expect
it to hold under more general assumptions than those we have assumed. For example, we have
adopted the usual CARA-Normal framework, which is the only tractable specication under our
information structure. However, nothing in our results seem to depend on a particular feature of
preferences, at least in an obvious way; we thus conjecture that they would remain valid under much
more general (risk averse) preferences. Similarly, while our information structure allows for the
presence of both idiosyncratic and common informational noise components, it remains restrictive
in the sense that both components are constrained to vanish at the same rate when the precision
of private information goes to innity (since the relation between the two is parameterised by the
correlation coe¢ cient ). We show formally in the online technical appendix that our results can
be generalised to an information structure allowing each noise component to vanish at di¤erent
rates.
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6. Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1 There are three aggregate shocks (, ~, "), hence three random variables
that may a¤ect p. Equation (1), implies that the e¤ects of  and  1=2x ~ on private signals are
indistinguishable. Hence we dene ~   +  1=2x ~ and restrict our attention to equilibrium price
functions p(~; ") that are linear in (~; ") (so that p is normally distributed). A trader i with
risk aversion coe¢ cient i and information set Gi has a demand for assets ki(Gi) =  1i E[  
pjGi]=V[  pjGi]. We may thus write the demands by demand-schedule and market-order traders
as kiInM (xi; p) = 
 1
i fInM (xi; p) and k
i
M (xi) = 
 1
i fM (xi), respectively, with
fInM (xi; p) = E[   pjxi; p]=V[jxi; p]; fM (xi) = E[   pjxi]=V[   pjxi]:
A.1. Price function. We conjecture that fInM , fM have the form fInM (xi; p) = a(xi  
) + (p) and fM (xi) = c(xi   ), where a, c are normalised trading intensities (for a trader with
i = 1) and  () is a linear function. Using the convention that the average signal equals ~ a.s.,
and recalling that i is independent from i   ~, the order book is given by
L(p) =
Z
InM
kiInM (xi; p)di+
Z
M
kiM (xi)di+ " =
Z
InM
a(xi   ) + (p)
i
di+
Z
M
c(xi   )
i
di+ "
=
h
a( +  1=2x ~   )
i Z
InM
 1i di+ c( + 
 1=2
x
~   )
Z
M
 1i di+ "+ (p)
Z
InM
 1i di
= B( +  1=2x ~ +B
 1") B +  1InM(p), with B = a 1InM + c (1  )  1M .
The market making sector observes L(:); a linear function of p; and sets p = E[jL(:)] = E[jz],
where z =  +  1=2x ~ + B 1" summarises the information provided by the order book. Since z
provides a signal about  with noise ~"   1=2x ~ +B 1" we have:
p = E[jz] = 
 + ~"z
 + ~"
 N  ;V (p) , where ~" = 1V (~") = B2"1 + B2"=x :
Rearranging the latter expression gives the price function (7) in Lemma 1.
A.2. Investment functions for  2 (0; 1). We now need to identify the parameters a
and c in the demand functions, which requires computing the conditional moments of    pjGi,
for Gi = (xi; p) (demand schedules) or Gi = xi (market orders). We start with the former and
specically focus on the moments of jxi; p which is without loss of generality. To this purpose
dene   [  ~ p xi ]0N4 (E () ;V ()). From (1), (7) and the fact that ~ =  +  1=2x ~,
we have, for  2 (0; 1),  = [     ]0+MS, with
M =
266664

 1=2
 0 0 0

 1=2
 
1=2
 1=2
x 0 0
B
 1=2
 B
1=2
 1=2
x 
 1=2
" 0

 1=2
 
1=2
 1=2
x 0 (1  )1=2  1=2x
377775 , S =
266664

1=2

 
   
 1=2 ~

1=2
" "
(1  ) 1=2 i
377775N4 (0; I) :
Next, we compute V () = MM0 and then partition V () as V () = [km] ; k = 1; 2, with
all four km being 2 2 matrices. Then, from standard multivariate normal theory we know that
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[  ~ ]0jp; xi has distribution N2

[   ]0 + 12 122 [ p   xi    ]0;11   12 122 21

, from
which we infer the following conditional moments:
E [jp; xi] =  +
x
 
xi   

+ (1  )B2" (B) 1
 
p  
(1  ) (1 + =x)B2" + x +  ; (A1)
V[jp; xi] = 1 + (1  ) B
2"=x
(1  ) (1 + =x)B2" + x +  : (A2)
Substituting these values into kiInM (xi; p) = 
 1
i E[   pjxi; p]=V[jxi; p] and rearranging gives
the corresponding asset demand in Lemma 1.
We now turn to the computation of  pjxi. We dene, still for  2 (0; 1),
 [  ~    p xi ]0
N4 (E (
) ;V (
)) and note that 
 =[   0  ]0+NT, where
N =
266664

 1=2
 0 0 0

 1=2
 
1=2
 1=2
x 0 0
(1  B) 1=2  B1=2 1=2x   1=2" 0

 1=2
 
1=2
 1=2
x 0 (1  )1=2  1=2x
377775 ; T =
266664

1=2

 
   
 1=2 ~

1=2
" "
(1  ) 1=2 i
377775 ;
so that T N4 (0; I). We partition V (
) = NN0 as follows: V (
) =

km

; k;m = 1; 2, where
11 is 3  3, 12 is 3  1, 21 is 1  3 and 22 is 1  1. It follows that [  ~    p ]0jxi has
distribution N3

[   0 ]0 + 12  122
 
xi   

; 11   12  122 21

. After some calculations, we
infer from this joint distribution that:
E [   pjxi] =
 
(1  B) 1   B 1x
  
xi   

 1 + 
 1
x
; (A3)
V[   pjxi] = (B)2
  
+ =x +B
 2="
2
x + 
+
(1  )
x
+
1
B2"
!
: (A4)
Substituting (A3)-(A4) into kiM (xi) = 
 1
i E[ pjxi]=V[ pjxi] and rearranging gives the asset
demand of market-order traders in Lemma 1.
A.3. Investment functions for  2 f0; 1g. The expressions for fInM (xi; p), fM (xi); which
have been derived for  2 (0; 1), can be extended by continuity to  2 f0; 1g. For example, for
 = 0 we have z =  + B 1", and computing the joint distribution of (p; xi; ) gives the same
conditional moments as those in (A1)(A4) when setting  = 0. Similarly, when  = 1 all informed
traders receive the same signal x =  +  1=2x ~, ~  N (0; 1), hence observing p does not provide
any more information about  than observing x. It follows that:
E[jp; x] = E[jx] =   + xx = ( + x) ; V[jp; x] = V[jx] = (x + ) 1 ;
which is recovered by setting  = 1 in (A1)(A4). Hence the expressions for kInM (xi; p; i),
kM (xi; i) in Lemma 1 are valid for  2 (0; 1) [ f0; 1g = [0; 1].
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A.4. Uniqueness of linear equilibrium. We nally show that B is unique, positive and
nite. To do this, dene the function f : R! R as
f (B) =
x
InM

1 + (1 )B
2"
x
+ 1  
M
 
 1x +  1
 
1 +B2 "x

 

 +B2"

1 + x
 1 B;
so that a root of f (B) solves (9). f is continuous and strictly decreasing over [0;+1) and such
that f (0) = xInM + (1  )
x
M
> 0 and f (+1) =  1. Hence f is a bijection with a unique root
B0 > 0 over [0;+1). Since f is strictly positive on R , B0 is the unique root of f in R.
B. Proof of Proposition 1 From (7), p is observationally equivalent to z = + 1=2x ~+B 1",
so both provide the same information about . It follows that the precision of the price signal is:
p = z = 1=V( 1=2x ~ +B 1") = 1=
 
 1x +B
 2 1"

(B1)
B.1. Full market-order case. We know from Lemma 1 that B > 0 uniquely solves (9).
Now dene the function g : R+  R+ ! R as follows:
g (B;x) = 
 1
I
h 
 1x + 
 1

  
1 +B2"=x
    +B2" (1 + =x) 1i 1  B;
When  = 0, B is the unique solution to g (B;x) = 0. Since g is continuously di¤erentiable,
increasing in ax and decreasing in B on R+R+, the implicit function B (x) dened by g (B;x) =
0 is continuously di¤erentiable and increasing over R+. Moreover, we have:
 
 1x + 
 1

  
1 +B2"=x
    +B2" (1 + =x) 1
  1  
 
B2" (1 + =x) + 
 1   1    B2" +  1 ;
so that B =  1I
h 
 1x + 
 1

  
1 +B2"=x
    +B2" (1 + =x) 1i 1
  1I
h
 1  
 
B2" + 
 1i 1
=  1I 
 
B2" + 
   1I   1 + B 2 1" 
The function h+ : B ! B    1I 
 
1 + =B
2"

is continuous and strictly increasing over
R+, and such that h+(0) =  1 and h+(+1) = +1. It is thus bijective and we denote its
inverse by h 1+ . Then B 2 h 1+ (] 1; 0]) is bounded above by h 1+ (0), which is positive and
independent of x. Hence, B0  limx!1B(x) is dened and, by continuity, is the unique
solution to IB =

 1  
 
 + "B
2
 1 1. From (7) we then infer that limx!1 p = B20".
B.2. Other cases. When  2 (0; 1], B (x) is implicitly dened as the unique solution to
(9). When  2 f0; 1g, we have
B (x)
x
InM
= 1 +
(1  ) =M 
 1x +  1

(1 +B2"=x) 

B (x)
2 " (1 + =x) + 
 1 1x
InM
;
so that B (x)  x=InM . Hence, whenever  2 f0; 1g and  > 0 we have limx!+1B (x) =
+1 and limx!+1 [B (x)]2 =x = +1.
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It follows that limx!+1B (x) =

x
InM

is equal to
1 + lim
x!+1
(1  ) =M 
 1x +  1
 
1 +B (x)
2 "=x

 

B (x)
2 " (1 + =x) + 
 1 1x
InM
= 1;
so that B (x) 
x!+1
x=InM . Now, recall from (7) that p =
 
=x +B
 2="
 1. Hence,
for  = 0 we have limx!+1 p = limx!+1 [B (x)]
2 " = (x=InM )2", that is p 
x!+1
(=InM )2"2x. However, for  = 1 we have p x!+1 x. Indeed, in this case we have 
 1
p =
 1x + B 2 1" , and we know that limx!+1B 2 1" = 1x =  1" limx!+1 x=B2 = 0, from
which it follows that  1p x!+1 
 1
x .
Let us now turn to the case where  2 (0; 1). In that situation (9) implies that
B (x)  x
InM
1
1 + (1  )B (x)2 "=x
, B (x)

1=2
x

1 + (1  )B (x)2 "=x

 
1=2
x
InM
;
so that limx!1B (x) =
1=2
x = limx!1B (x)
2 =x = +1. Moreover, again from (9) we have
B(x)
3
2x
=
=InM
x=B(x)2 + (1  )"+
[(1  ) =M ]B(x)2=2x
1
x
+ 1

1 + B(x)
2"
x

 

B (x)
2 "

1 + x

+ 
 1
Now, since
[(1  ) =M ]B(x)2=2x
1
x
+ 1

1 + B(x)
2"
x

 

B (x)
2 "

1 + x

+ 
 1 !x!1 0 and xB (x)2 !x!1 0;
we get
B3(x)
2x
!
x!1
=InM
(1  )" ) B(x) x!1
 
2x=InM
(1  )"
!1=3
.
Recall that  1p =  1x + B 2 1" , and we have shown that limx!1B (x)
2 =x = +1.
Hence, limx!1 x=B (x)
2 = 0, so that  1p x!1 
 1
x .
C. Proof of Lemma 2 Let us rst state the version of the law of total variance that is relevant
in our context:
V[E[   pjxi; p]jxi] = V[   pjxi]  E[V[   pjxi; p]jxi] = V[   pjxi]  V[   pjxi; p]; (C1)
and V[E[   pjxi]] = V[   p]  E[V[   pjxi]] = V[   p]  V[   pjxi]: (C2)
C.1. Timing 1: Order type chosen after the signal is observed Under timing 1 traders
observe xi, know that the price will be a linear function of normally distributed variables, and then
compare WM (xi; i) and E

WInM (xi; p; i)
xi. We rst write WM () as
WM (xi; i) =  e y
2
M;i ; with yM;i  E[   pjxi]p
2V[   pjxi]
: (C3)
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Similarly, WInM (xi; p; i) =  e y
2
InM;i+ci , with yInM;i  E[   pjxi; p]=
p
2V[   pjxi; p] and
yInM;ijxi  N
 
E[   pjxi]p
2V[   pjxi; p]
;
V[E[   pjxi; p]jxi]
2V[   pjxi; p]
!
:
Using the fact that y2InM;ijxi has a noncentral chi -square distribution (see, e.g., Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980), the moment-generating function yields:
E

WInM (xi; p; i)
xi
=  E[e y2InM;i+ci jxi] =   e
ciq
1 + 2V

yInM;ijxi
 exp
 
 
 
E

yInM;ijxi
2
1 + 2V

yInM;ijxi
!
=  eci

V[   pjxi; p]
V[   pjxi; p] + V[E[   pjxi; p]jxi]
1=2
exp
 
 1
2
(E[   pjxi])2
V[   pjxi; p] + V[E[   pjxi; p]jxi]
!
=  eci
s
V[   pjxi; p]
V[   pjxi] exp
 
 1
2
(E[   pjxi])2
V[   pjxi]
!
; (C4)
where we have used (C1) to go from the second to the third line. Comparing (C3) and (C4) gives
the rst ratio in Lemma 2.
C2. Timing 2: Order type chosen before the signal is observed Under timing 2,
traders choose their order type before knowing xi. We recover the relevant expected utility levels
by integrating those under timing 1 over xi. First, noting that y2M;i has a noncentral chi -square
distribution and making use of (C2), we obtain:
E [WM (xi; i)] = E[  e y
2
M;i ] =  

1 +
V[E[   pjxi]]
V[   pjxi]
 1=2
=  

V[   p]
V[   pjxi]
 1=2
: (C5)
Now, using the law of iterated expectations and integrating (C4) over xi we get:
E

WInM (xi; p; i)

= E

E

WInM (xi; p; i)
xi
=  eci

V[   pjxi; p]
V[   pjxi]
1=2
E
"
exp
 
 1
2
(E[   pjxi])2
V[   pjxi]
!#
(C6)
But again, (E[   pjxi])2 also has a noncentral chi -square distribution and we have:
E
"
exp
 
  (E[   pjxi])2
2V[   pjxi]
!#
=

1 +
V[E[   pjxi]]
V[   pjxi]
 1=2
: (C7)
Substituting (C7) into (C6), making use of (C2) and rearranging, we get:
E

WInM (xi; p; i)

=  eci

V[   p]
V[   pjxi; p]
 1=2
: (C8)
Comparing (C5) and (C8) gives the second ratio in Lemma 2.
D. Proof of Proposition 2 See the separate online technical appendix.
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